INTRODUCTION
Market efficiency has been widely studied in the field of finance for decades, as it provides an investor with a sense of how well the price signal works at conveying all available information, and thus informs an investor of the necessity to acquire additional information about the firm issuing the security.
1 Market efficiency has gained acceptance within the [Vol:55 court system as a means of facilitating proof in securities fraud litigation. In particular, in the 1988 case of Basic v. Levinson, the United States Supreme Court firmly established the fraudon-the-market theory as a means for securities fraud plaintiffs to satisfy the legal element that they had relied upon a material misrepresentation or omission in purchasing or selling a security. While the courts have recently reexamined whether the legal sector's use of the efficient market theory is justified, it remains firmly entrenched in judicial analysis. Thus detailed economic analysis of market efficiency will continue to play a significant role in securities cases. Because reliance is a required element of securities fraud cases and because class action procedures generally require that plaintiffs show that reliance can be proven on a class-wide basis, courts most frequently assess market efficiency at the class certification stage of securities fraud cases-the point at which the court determines if the plaintiffs' claims are best tried individually or whether numerous plaintiffs can collectively pursue essentially the same claim against the defendant at the same time. Trial courts thus devote significant time and energy to determinations about market efficiency in deciding whether to certify a case for class action treatment.
In Cammer v. Bloom (D. N.J. 1989) , the federal district court enumerated several factors for determining market efficiency of the securities in question: (1) the average weekly trading volume, (2) the number of security analysts following and reporting on the security, (3) the extent to which market makers traded the security, (4) the issuer's eligibility to file an SEC registration Form S-3, and (5) the cause-and-effect relationship between material disclosures and changes in the security's price.
3 These "Cammer factors" have been adopted by a number of courts, while still other courts have added other factors. 4 For instance, one court considered the company's market capitalization and the size of the public float for the security, while another considered the ability to sell short the security and the level of autocorrelation between the security's prices. 5 From finance theory, the market for a security is said to be "semistrong form efficient" if the price of the security reflects all publicly available information. Prices of securities reflect, albeit to varying extents, all publicly available information; therefore, markets for securities are semistrong form efficient in varying degrees. Much research has also been done to determine the mechanisms by which the pricing signal operates, and it is widely understood that correction of mispricing of a stock primarily occurs through arbitrage activity. 6 Since arbitrage is not a cost-free activity, and because frictions remain, whether in the form of transaction costs, idiosyncratic risk, or other costs and risks associated with trading securities, pricing anomalies may persist. 7 As a result, everything else remaining the same, financial economics tells us that the market for a stock with a higher arbitrage cost will be less efficient-i.e., a stock's market efficiency is negatively related to its arbitrage risk. 8 Thus, we refer to arbitrage risk 3. 711 F. Supp. 1264 3. 711 F. Supp. , 1286 . See In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 633 n.14 (3d Cir. 2011); Teamsters Local 445 Freight Div. Pension, Fund v. Bombardier, Inc., 546 F.3d 196, 204-05 n. 11 (2d Cir. 2008) ; In re Xcelera.com Sec. Litig., 430 F.3d 503, 508 (1st Cir. 2005) ; Unger v. Amedisys Inc., 401 F.3d 316, 323 (5th Cir. 2005) ; Gariety v. Grant Thornton, LLP, 368 F.3d 356, 368 (4th Cir. 2004); Binder v. Gillespie, 184 F.3d 1059 , 1064 -65 (9th Cir. 1999 8. This implies that Market Efficiency Percentile -1 = 100 -Arbitrage Risk Percentile. For example, if a stock is at the 25th percentile for arbitrage risk, then the stock is at the 76th percentile for market efficiency.
as a negative proxy for market efficiency. We discuss this in detail in Part II.
Consider an arbitrageur whose information suggests that a stock is underpriced. The arbitrageur will then "go long" on that stock (buy and hold the stock) in order to obtain arbitrage profits by selling the stock at a later date. However, the arbitrageur will also manage the risk of holding the stock by hedging. As a result of our interviews with traders "in the trenches," we model the arbitrageur as choosing the optimal hedge stocks and the optimal hedge ratios. The risk of this optimal arbitrage portfolio is the arbitrage risk of the stock, our negative proxy for market efficiency. We discuss these calculations in detail.
We provide a methodology that can calculate the market efficiency percentile of a stock over the relevant period, based on the data for a comparable measurement period.
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For example, in Lefkoe, et al. v. Jos. A. Bank Clothiers, Inc., If it is not possible (or desirable) to use a different measurement period-e.g., if the period of interest immediately follows an initial public offering (IPO)-then we can do the calculations with the measurement period as the relevant period, and we call this the ex post arbitrage risk of the security for the relevant period. For example, in a recent securities class action filed against Groupon, Inc., the class period was defined as November 4, 2011 to March 30, 2012. Since the class period immediately follows the IPO, we do not have trading data from a prior period to use as the measurement period.
For this paper, we focus on ex ante (baseline) arbitrage risk, but we do sensitivity analyses with ex post arbitrage risk as another negative proxy for market efficiency. We apply this methodology to calculate, on a yearly basis, the arbitrage risk for each U.S. exchange-listed common stock from 1988 to 2010 (subject to certain restrictions). We also perform a regression analysis of arbitrage risk (as a negative proxy of market efficiency) on the factors identified by courts in securities class actions. These results are summarized in Table 1.   10 9. We interpret comparability to mean a time interval that is proximate in location and length.
10. We detail all the variables in Section 4. We use 5% as our level of Heteroskedasticity, 48 ECONOMETRICA 817 (1980) . [Vol:55 volume) but removed market capitalization from the list of factors, reflecting the fact that, ceteris paribus, the volume for a stock with higher market capitalization will be higher. For this set, we found that the results were the same as in Table 1 , except that market efficiency was positively and significantly affected by number of analysts; positively but insignificantly affected by number of market makers (for Nasdaq stocks); positively but ambiguously affected by serial correlation; and positively and significantly affected by inclusion in the Dow Jones Industrial Average (DJIA) (the latter makes sense because in this set, market capitalization is not used as an explanatory factor, whereas it was used as such for the results in Table 1 ). The second set uses only the Cammer factors as explanatory variables. For this set, we found that the results were the same as in Table 1 , except that market efficiency is positively but insignificantly affected by logarithm of volume (or logarithm of dollar volume); and positively and significantly affected by number of analysts.
In Part I, we detail the development and application of market efficiency to securities class actions. In Part II, we develop arbitrage risk as a negative proxy for market efficiency. In Part III, we provide regression results that test the various factors believed to determine market efficiencywe also investigate the empirical findings that are apparently inconsistent with "conventional wisdom" and show that the empirical findings are actually consistent with the principles of financial economics. Part IV concludes the paper.
I. MARKET EFFICIENCY AND SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS
General acceptance of the relevance of the efficient market hypothesis by the courts was confirmed with the case of Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224 (1988) , in which the U.S. Supreme Court adopted the fraud-on-the-market theory. But to understand the courts' use of market efficiency, it is important first to understand what plaintiffs are required to prove in establishing a securities fraud claim.
In a typical claim of securities fraud pursued under section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, pl aintiffs must prove (1) a material misrepresentation or omission by a defendant, (2) scienter, (3) a connection between the misrepresentation or omission and the purchase or sale of a security, (4) reliance upon the misrepresentation or omission, (5) economic loss, and (6) loss causation.
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To justify proceeding as a class action, instead of an individual's claim, plaintiffs must also show that (1) the potential class of affected parties is so large that including them all individually is impractical, (2) questions of law or fact are common to all potential class members, (3) the claims of the named representative are typical of the potential class, and (4) the named representative can fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.
12 Additionally, plaintiffs must establish at least one of the following: (1) that individual actions risk inconsistent rulings, yielding incompatible standards of conduct or risk impairing the rights of potential class members not a part of the lawsuit, or (2) final injunctive or declarative relief is appropriate, respecting the class as a whole, or (3) the questions of law or fact common to the potential class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members and that a class action is superior to other methods of adjudication.
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This last requirement, known as the predominance requirement, is frequently used to establish the additional Rule 23(b) standard for class actions.
Until the adoption of the fraud-on-the-market theory in Basic, it was difficult for plaintiffs to establish the reliance element of their claim since they likely bought or sold the underlying security without direct knowledge of the alleged misrepresentation or omission. It was even more challenging to establish that the evidence of reliance by all class members was common to each of them, that all class members relied on the same information and to the same degree in making their securities purchases or sales. The fraud-on-the-market theory was designed to address plaintiffs' difficulties in establishing reliance, with the added benefit that it provided a presumption of reliance applicable to all investors of the security in question.
The fraud-on-the-market theory avoids the pitfall facing plaintiffs by providing them with a rebuttable presumption of reliance upon the alleged misrepresentations so long as the market for the underlying security is efficient.
14 The notion is that, in an open and developed securities market, the price of 11. Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, 133 S. Ct. 1184 , 1192 (2013 .
12. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a). 13. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(b). 14. In re DVI, Inc. Sec. Litig., 639 F.3d 623, 631 (3d Cir. 2010).
a security is determined by the publicly available information about the underlying company, including the alleged misrepresentation.
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Assessment of market efficiency is generally first presented at the class certification stage of securities fraud cases, the point at which the court resolves whether the plaintiffs' claims are best tried individually or whether numerous plaintiffs can collectively pursue essentially the same claim against the defendant at the same time. At the class certification stage, plaintiffs can present evidence that they traded shares in an efficient market, and the court then presumes that investors who traded securities in that market relied on public, material misrepresentations regarding those securities.
16 Defendants can rebut the presumption of reliance by presenting evidence challenging actual reliance or market efficiency. Based on the evidence presented, the court then decides whether or not the matter can legitimately proceed as a class action.
A class certification hearing is not a trial on the merits and is often conducted before full discovery is completed, so plaintiffs do not need to prove each of the claim elements on the merits at the class certification stage. But plaintiffs are required to prove-not simply plead-the Rule 23(a) class action requirements and, most typically, that questions of law or fact common to all class members predominate over any questions affecting only individual members.
17 Over the years, tensions have grown, however, as the proof required to establish the class action requirements now frequently spills over into the merits of the underlying claims themselves. The courts are thus struggling to determine what and how much information must be proven during class certification contests.
Amid two recent and significant 5-4 decisions reversing class certification decisions because plaintiffs failed to prove the requirements of Rule 23, Inc. v Basic decision even while demonstrating that the fraud-on-themarket theory and the efficient market theory increasingly are coming under harsh attack. In Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds, 568 U.S. ___ (2013), a 6-3 majority decided that the materiality requirement of a securities claim was sufficiently distinct from market efficiency and the public nature of securities claims such that it did not have to be established at the class certification stage. The Court reasoned that whether a misrepresentation was sufficiently material to a stock price was certainly a matter of common proof such that the courts do not need to delve into the merits of this issue during class certification. The Court essentially held that, while the parties are presenting event studies that go to the reliance (and the predominance of the common reliance evidence) to show that a stock price effect exists, plaintiffs need not prove during class certification that the stock price effect was material. Although certainly implicit in Scalia's short dissenting opinion, neither his dissent nor the dissent of Thomas (joined by Scalia and Kennedy) explicitly suggested that the Basic decision should be overruled, presumably because that issue was not directly before the Court.
Amgen is consistent with the Court's unanimous decision two years earlier in Erica P. John Fund, Inc. v. Halliburton Co., ___ U.S. ___ (2011), which held that plaintiffs need not prove loss causation, that the misrepresentation in question caused the plaintiffs' economic loss, at the class certification stage. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals had previously ruled in favor of Halliburton that plaintiffs' proof of loss causation, that company statements "actually caused the stock price to fall and resulted in the losses," was necessary to invoke the Basic presumption of reliance.
18 Before the Supreme Court, Halliburton also suggested that insufficient evidence existed as to any price impact, thus suggesting there was nothing to rely upon in order to invoke the Basic presumption. presumption of reliance. 20 The Court remanded the matter for reconsideration of the trial court's class certification decision.
Subsequently, the district court granted class certification, which the Fifth Circuit affirmed. 21 Halliburton then appealed to the Supreme Court and presented two issues. First and foremost, the Court addressed whether the Basic presumption of liability should be overruled, and thus whether plaintiffs should be required to prove actual reliance, including whether class-wide, common proof of reliance was now required at the class certification stage of litigation. 22 Second, the Court addressed the extent to which evidence of a presumption of reliance could be rebutted by defendants at the class certification stage, recognizing that class certification hearings are not supposed to be trials on the merits but also recognizing that the Court's recent class action decisions place increasing burdens on plaintiffs to prove (as oppose to presume) the class action requirements of Rule 23.
23
The Supreme Court yet again unanimously vacated the lower court rulings and instructed the trial court to re-examine the evidence on class certification. 24 Five justices, led by Chief Justice Roberts, determined that Halliburton should be given an opportunity to rebut the Basic presumption of reliance by presenting evidence of a lack of any price impact.
25 Justices Ginsburg, Breyer and Sotomayor concurred, recognizing that the evidentiary burden of rebutting the Basic presumption falls on defendants and thus should not be an additional hurdle for class action plaintiffs.
26 Justices Thomas, Alito and Scalia concurred in the result but suggested that Basic should now be overruled, in part because " ' overwhelming empirical evidence' now suggests that even when markets do incorporate public information, they often fail to do so accurately" and that " ' [s] efficiency 'more contestable than ever. ' " 27 Thus, the Basic presumption remains a fixture of federal securities litigation even though the judicial system is now amply aware of the debates within finance theory about the extent and usefulness of the efficient market hypothesis. Furthermore, the academic debates themselves will certainly carry over into future class certification analyses as Halliburton supports defendants' efforts to garner evidence and present their own event studies challenging the efficiency of the information signals associated with plaintiffs' allegations of misrepresentations.
Without doubt, federal district courts will continue to conduct ever more rigorous reviews of market efficiency at the class certification stage of securities lawsuits. The scope and structure of these analyses are necessarily case-by-case, left to the parties and their financial experts to present evidence to the courts, with the courts then making legal determinations about whether the pertinent markets were "efficient enough" to justify the Basic presumption of reliance.
As such, we propose to use our methodology here to examine the market efficiency factors that parties have typically presented to the courts and upon which the courts have relied in making their determinations. In addition to the Cammer factors referred to earlier, such factors include market capitalization, size of the public float, ability to sell short the security, and level of autocorrelation between the security's prices.
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Our results will shed light on whether litigants and the courts are presenting evidence consistent with the results of finance theory and empirics. accurately the pricing signal works. When all publicly available information is reflected in a security's price, the market for the security is said to be semistrong form efficient. 29 We interpret the concept not as an either/or, binary construct, but rather as a relative concept occurring along a continuum, and thus one often refers to a market's relative efficiency.
II. ARBITRAGE RISK AS
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The pricing signal is thought to work through the actions of all traders who, whatever their level of knowledge and sophistication, convey their individual valuations to the market through their buy and sell decisions at various price points. 31 The collective actions of all traders thus push the price of a particular security toward its market equilibrium level, but do not necessarily take the market for the security all the way to perfect semistrong form efficiency.
Arbitrageurs are investors who trade on information about relative values. They trade investments that are or should be fundamentally correlated but for which they believe the market valuations are deviating from the fundamental relation. Thus arbitrageurs attempt to take advantage of the market pricing discrepancies between otherwise fundamentally correlated securities in order to earn trading profits. This activity of exploiting situations in which markets are not efficient assists the pricing signal by conveying information to the market and helping to push the market to efficiency, but does not necessarily take the market all the way to perfect semistrong form efficiency.
But as Pontiff explains, because of "costly arbitrage," arbitrageurs are unlikely to ever completely eliminate mispricing.
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He identifies two sources of arbitrage costs: transactions costs (e.g., commissions, brokerage fees) and holding costs (e.g., opportunity cost of capital and the idiosyncratic risk of a security), and he stresses the importance of idiosyncratic risk in making arbitrage a costly endeavor. investments, supposedly correlated in returns, they cannot find perfectly positive correlations in returns and thus perfect substitutes as investments (or perfectly negative correlations in returns and perfect complements as investments), so they are always exposed to the vagaries of each individual security they hold. Even aggregated across a number of investment positions within the hedge portfolio, the legs of the arbitrage, arbitrageurs cannot eliminate the idiosyncratic risk of any security. As a result of the costs of arbitrage, including idiosyncratic risk, market inefficiencies will always remain; the better arbitrage works, the more efficient the market for a security is likely to be. As a result, the costs of arbitrage for a security provide a means to test the efficiency of the security.
Pontiff concludes that "idiosyncratic risk is the single largest cost faced by arbitrageurs," and that "idiosyncratic risk is the single largest barrier to arbitrage." 34 Our notion of arbitrage risk is a generalization of the standard notion of idiosyncratic risk, defined as the standard deviation of residuals from the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). 35 If an arbitrageur is constrained to having access to only the market index and a risk-free instrument to devise an optimal zero-net-investment arbitrage portfolio, then the risk of the resulting optimal arbitrage portfolio is the standard idiosyncratic risk. For our notion of ex ante or ex post arbitrage risk, however, we model the arbitrageur as optimally choosing the components of the arbitrage portfolio from the universe of the market index and all exchange-listed U.S. common stocks, based on financial data on the returns of the stock of interest, all candidate securities, and the risk-free instrument over the measurement period. Then, given the optimal choice of the components of the arbitrage portfolio, and the risk-free instrument, we model the arbitrageur as choosing the optimal hedge ratios under a zero-net-investment constraint. The risk of this optimal arbitrage portfolio is the arbitrage risk of the stock, our negative proxy for market efficiency. Our interviews with traders "in the trenches" confirm this overall structure of 34 hedging behavior by arbitrageurs. Wurgler and Zhuravskaya construct a similar notion of arbitrage risk, but their substitute securities are selected from similarities in product market characteristics. 36 We thus develop a practical and general (negative) proxy for market efficiency by quantifying the arbitrage risk associated with each individual security.
This simple (negative) proxy for market efficiency then allows for an examination of a variety of factors that have been proffered by economists and lawyers as affecting market efficiency.
We calculate the arbitrage risk of a stock over a defined relevant period as follows:
We select the relevant period, which can be a day, a week, a court-determined "class" period, or other time frame of relevance (simply for presentation in this paper, we have chosen annual periods).
We choose a period immediately prior to the relevant period as the measurement period, because the arbitrageur would not have had access to relevant-period data at the beginning of the relevant period (also for simplicity, we have chosen the year prior to the relevant period as the measurement period).
On the basis of the measurement period, we determine the lowest risk portfolio that an arbitrageur would use to benefit from mispricing, as explained above. We call this portfolio the arbitrage portfolio for the stock.
The ex ante (or baseline) arbitrage risk of the security for the relevant period is the risk of the arbitrage portfolio over the relevant period.
If it is not possible (or desirable) to use a different measurement period-e.g., if the period of interest immediately follows an initial public offering-then we can do the calculations where the measurement period is the same as the relevant period, and we call this the ex post arbitrage risk of the security for the relevant period. For this paper, we focus on ex ante (baseline) arbitrage risk, but we do sensitivity analyses with ex post arbitrage risk as another negative proxy for market efficiency.
Consider a stock that is underpriced (overpriced) according to the information available to an arbitrageur. In order to exploit this profitable opportunity, the arbitrageur will construct the following arbitrage portfolio with zero net investment, thereby reaping arbitrage profits when closing out the investment portfolio:
Arbitrage numerator: go long (short) on the mispriced stock; let's say by $1 (purely a normalization).
Other arbitrage legs: Go short (long) on N other securities. We use N = 5 legs for the baseline model, but the results do not change qualitatively with values of N = 10 or 20.
Go short (long) on the risk-free asset. The total amount on these legs has to add up to $1 short (long).
How much to go short (long) on each leg is called the corresponding Hedge Ratio.
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The risk of a portfolio over a period is defined as the standard deviation of daily returns of the portfolio over that period. Since the arbitrageur does not have access to all relevant period data at the beginning of the relevant period, we choose a period immediately prior to the relevant period as the measurement period, and the arbitrage portfolio is selected to minimize the risk (i.e., the standard deviation of daily returns) of the arbitrage portfolio 38 over the measurement period, with the requirement described above that the arbitrage portfolio require zero investment. The risk of the arbitrage portfolio over the relevant period is the arbitrage risk of the stock for the relevant period. For this paper:
We measure arbitrage risk for U.S. exchange-listed common stocks, We consider only U.S. exchange-listed common stocks, and the S&P 500 index, as candidate legs of the hedge portfolio, and
We use daily returns on six-month U.S. Treasury bills as the daily risk-free rate.
39 Table 2 shows examples of exchange-listed stocks and their estimated market efficiency percentiles in 2010, on the 37. Id. at 593 (providing the computational simplification used here). 38. "Arbitrageurs generally construct hedge portfolios to minimize the total risk of the portfolio." HARRIS, supra note 6, at 348. basis of our measure of arbitrage risks of all U.S. exchangelisted common stocks. Table 3 demonstrates that different stocks display different patterns of market efficiency across time. We test the empirical relation with arbitrage risk (as a negative proxy for market efficiency) of factors relied upon by courts and others as determinants of market efficiency.
40 This is done for all U.S. exchange-listed common stocks from 1988 (the year of the landmark Basic decision detailed in Part I) to 2010, the last year for which we have full data, with the following restrictions.
We restricted attention to stock-year combinations consisting of stocks that had one PERMNO, one ticker, and one CUSIP over the year in the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) Daily Stock Database. We utilized each stock available from CRSP, 41 for which the following data exist for at least 75% of trading days during each of the relevant and measurement periods:
• Returns • Shares outstanding • Trading volume • Closing bid • Closing ask • Exchange membership • Number of market makers. To include a particular stock in our analysis, we also required data to be available for:
• factors that courts and others have relied upon as influencing market efficiency. These measures are each defined below.
• Turnover: mean daily turnover (volume)/(shares outstanding) over the relevant period.
• Number of security analysts: number of security analysts who announced at least one projection about the security during the relevant period.
• Number of market makers for Nasdaq stocks:
highest, over the relevant period, of the number of market makers on each day.
• Market capitalization: mean of daily logarithm of market capitalization over the relevant year.
• Bid-ask spread: mean of daily relative spread (closing ask − closing bid)/(closing price) over the relevant period.
• Public float ratio: mean of quarterly public float ratio (shares outstanding − insider holdings)/ (shares outstanding) over the relevant period.
• Institutional ownership ratio: institutional ownership ratio (institutional holdings)/(shares outstanding) over the relevant period.
• Serial correlation in CAPM: By performing the Durbin-Watson Test on the CAPM on daily returns for a stock for a calendar year, we obtain the pvalue for positive serial correlation and the p-value for negative serial correlation.
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The negative of the minimum of these p-values is a positive measure of serial correlation in the CAPM for the particular stock for the relevant year.
• Explanatory power of CAPM: R 2 of the CAPM for the security in the relevant period.
• Inclusion in the DJIA: If a stock is on the DJIA for an entire year, the indicator variable for that stock for that year is one. If a stock is not on the DJIA for an entire year, the indicator variable for that stock for that year is zero. If a stock is on the DJIA for only part of the year, the observation for that stock for that year is deleted from the regression. Summary statistics for arbitrage risk and for each of the explanatory variables are shown in Appendix 2.
For this paper, we perform a reduced-form regression of 42. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS (4th ed. 2000) .
arbitrage risk 43 on various factors of market efficiency, controlling for year. The results of this regression-which uses 35,587 observations (stock-years) and has R 2 = 0.463 and adjusted R 2 = 0.462 (see Appendix 3)-are shown in Table 4 . As with the results summarized in Table 1 , we checked the sensitivity of these results through a number of additional analyses. For one set, we replaced turnover with logarithm of volume (or logarithm of dollar volume) but removed market capitalization from the list of factors, reflecting the fact that, ceteris paribus, the volume for a stock with higher market capitalization will be higher. For this set, we found that the results were the same as in Table 4 , except that arbitrage risk was negatively and significantly affected by number of analysts; negatively but insignificantly affected by number of market makers (for Nasdaq stocks); negatively but ambiguously affected by serial correlation; and negatively and significantly affected by inclusion in the DJIA (the latter makes sense because in this set, market capitalization is not used as an explanatory factor, whereas it was used as such for the results in Table 4 ). The second set uses only the Cammer factors as explanatory variables. For this set, we found that the results were the same as in Table 4 , except that arbitrage risk is negatively but insignificantly affected by logarithm of volume (or logarithm of dollar volume); and negatively and significantly affected by number of analysts.
A. Trading Volume
The positive relation of trading volume or turnover with market efficiency is often considered almost axiomaticstatements such as "the more thinly traded the stock, the less efficient the market is" are common. However, this is not necessarily the case. 44 In order to appreciate how trading volume (or turnover) is often misunderstood, we need to appreciate that:
[I]nvestors trade among themselves because they are different. . . . The difference in their response to the same information generates trading.
The greater the information asymmetry, the larger the abnormal trading volume when public news arrives. 45 We would observe higher trading volume or turnover in the market for an asset if and only if: 46 1) Transaction costs (including bid-ask spread, commissions, and search costs) are low relative to dispersion in investor valuations. 2) Low-valuers hold more securities than highvaluers, and short sales costs are low relative to dispersion in investor valuations. Higher trading volume will therefore be observed with:
• Lower transaction costs, • Lower short sales costs, • Higher dispersion of investor valuations, and/or • Higher likelihood that an investor holds the asset. Clearly, market efficiency would be facilitated by lower transaction costs and lower short sales costs-and when a claim is made about higher trading volume being a factor favoring market efficiency, it is often implicitly based on this argument. However, there is no reason to conclude that, ceteris paribus, a higher dispersion in investor valuations, or a higher likelihood that an investor holds the asset, would lead to higher market efficiency.
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Given these contrary dependencies, the relation of market efficiency with turnover is fundamentally an empirical question, and our empirical finding, for all U.S. exchangelisted common stocks from 1988 to 2010, 48 is that turnover negatively and significantly affects market efficiency.
B. The Number of Market Makers
From the above discussion, we can see that the demand for market making services in a Nasdaq stock is an increasing function of dispersion in investor valuations-i.e., everything else remaining the same, a firm is more likely to be a market maker in a Nasdaq stock if the investor valuation profile for that stock is more dispersed, because there would be more trades to enable more profits.
However, the higher the number of market makers, the higher the competition for trades would be, and this would reduce the transaction costs of trades. Therefore, a higher number of market makers would be observed with higher dispersion (not unambiguously facilitating market efficiency, as shown above) and/or lower transaction cost (facilitating market efficiency).
47. With high dispersion in investor valuations, we can have a high trading volume (much of which can be due to noise trading), and a higher dispersion in investor valuations does not necessarily add to the efficiency of a market.
48. Restrictions are detailed at the beginning of Section 3.
Therefore, as above, the relation between the number of Nasdaq market makers and market efficiency is fundamentally empirical, and our empirical finding, for all U.S. exchange-listed common stocks from 1988 to 2010, 49 is that arbitrage risk for a Nasdaq stock is positively and significantly related to the number of market makers for that stock; and that market efficiency for a Nasdaq stock is negatively and significantly related to the number of market makers for that stock.
C. Serial Correlation
Serial correlation in the CAPM of a stock's daily returns, suggesting a day-to-day pattern of repeated performance, and is often considered evidence of market inefficiencies. Some scholars have suggested other explanations 50 of serial correlation that are consistent with market efficiency. In the presence of such inconsistent findings, this dependence becomes an empirical question. Our empirical findings suggest that, on the basis of all U.S. exchange-listed common stocks from 1988 to 2010, 51 serial correlation affects market efficiency positively and significantly.
D. Other Factors
The number of securities analysts is a Cammer factor, and other courts have suggested using public float as a factor favorable to a finding of market efficiency. Our empirical findings suggest that, on the basis of all U.S. exchange-listed common stocks from 1988 to 2010, 52 the number of securities analysts and public float have an ambiguous impact on market efficiency.
Consistent with the position taken by courts and others, we find that market capitalization and institutional ownership have significant empirical support based on our analysis. The bid-ask spread of a stock, which is a measure of transaction cost of a stock, has been used by courts as a factor inhibiting market efficiency, and our results confirm this position, too.
Although we have not found a court ruling where the inclusion of the relevant stock in a major index is a factor favorable to a finding of market efficiency, expert reports and testimony commonly use such an argument. It is interesting to note, however, that because we control for market capitalization, what the indicator variable corresponding to membership in the DJIA measures is purely how much the inclusion of the stock in the DJIA adds to the efficiency of the market for the stock, over and above what the stock's market capitalization predicts. We find, for all U.S. exchange-listed common stocks from 1988 to 2010, 53 that inclusion in the DJIA, over and above its size, significantly reduces the efficiency of the market for its stock.
It should be noted that these results are robust to alterations in the statistical model. We performed sensitivity analyses with a) ex post arbitrage risk, b) sign constraints on the correlations of returns in the determination of legs of the arbitrage portfolio, c) sign constraints on the hedge ratios, d) number of legs in the arbitrage portfolio, and e) the risk-free rate. The empirical findings are qualitatively the same as for the baseline regressions.
CONCLUSIONS
We discuss arbitrage risk, a negative proxy for market efficiency based on financial economics, and show how it can be applied to securities class actions.
We also test the dependence of arbitrage risk on various standard factors used by courts in the determination of market efficiency. Some of these empirical findings do not seem consistent with "conventional wisdom"-as Warren Buffett is famously supposed to have said, "Well, it may be all right in practice, but it will never work in theory." However, we suggest that our empirical findings are actually consistent with economic theory.
The list of determinants of market efficiency considered in this paper is not exhaustive.
Academic research and interviews with financial practitioners have suggested additional factors such as external and internal regulations, and industrial organization (including supply and demand structures) of product markets. We intend to utilize data on 53. Id. industry codes, and industry properties such as pricing and concentration, to analyze these additional factors affecting market efficiency.
Cammer Factor (5)-the cause-and-effect relationship between material disclosures and changes in the security's price-is typically analyzed using event studies, which are joint tests of market efficiency and significance of particular events. 54 Using summaries of such event studies as proxies for market efficiency in the context of a macro-analysis like ours would be possible only with substantial simplifications/ assumptions such as restricting our attention to earnings announcements different from consensus analyst forecasts as the only surprises for a stock. We intend to undertake such an analysis in the future.
Finally, we propose to investigate alternative proxies for market efficiency such as put-call parity of options on the security of interest in order to test the robustness of our results across varying measures of market efficiency. 54 . See, e.g., CAMPBELL, ET AL., supra note 30; and Pontiff, supra note 7, at 35.
